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1.  Introduction 
 
There is now broad agreement among social scientists that race and fairness are two of 
the most important determinants of generosity to the poor.
1 Empirical evidence from 
many different levels of analysis points to significant, and often substantial, effects of 
racial and ethnic group loyalty on redistribution. Across countries, those with more racial 
or ethnic fractionalization have less governmental redistribution (Alesina, Glaeser and 
Sacerdote 2001). Across states within the United States, those with more ethnic 
fractionalization spend less on public goods and social services (Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterly 1999). Across individuals, those who live in a locality with a higher fraction of 
welfare recipients of a different race are significantly more opposed to redistribution 
(Luttmer 2001), and racial attitudes seem to play an important role in attitudes to 
redistribution (Gilens 1999, Lee and Roemer 2006).
2 
The role of fairness in redistribution has also received a great deal of research 
attention. By fairness we mean strong reciprocity, which is the propensity to incur 
pecuniary costs to reward those who have been kind and to punish those who have been 
unkind (Gintis 2000, Fehr, Fischbacher, and Gächter 2002, Bowles and Gintis 2004). The 
type of “kindness” that motivates reciprocation involves good intentions, regardless of 
the outcome of those intentions (Rabin 1993). The strong reciprocity motive can be 
generalized such that people may want to reward those who have helped others or society 
in general and to punish those who have hurt others or society in general. Thus, strong 
reciprocity may motivate people to reward the industrious poor for trying hard to make it 
on their own by giving more charity or supporting more governmental redistribution to 
the poor; and to punish the “lazy” poor by withholding charity or opposing governmental 
redistribution to the poor (Fong, Bowles and Gintis 2006).
3  
                                                 
1 See Alesina and Giuliano (2009) for a review. 
2 For recent theoretical work, see Shayo (2009) and Lindqvist and Östling (2009) for interesting models of 
social identity (including racial identity) and redistribution. 
3 Evidence that people are more generous to the industrious poor than to the “lazy” poor can also be 
explained by related concepts from other fields, including: i) the equity principle of distributive justice, 
according to which the resources one receives from a system should increase with one’s inputs into the 
system (Walster, Walster and Berscheid 1978, Deutsch 1985); and ii) attribution theory in social 
psychology, according to which people are less generous to people whom they judge to be individually 
responsible for their need (Weiner 1995). See Konow (2003) for a review of empirical evidence on 
distributive justice.    2
Economists have modeled the relationships between beliefs about the causes of 
income, individual economic experiences, and governmental redistribution (Piketty 1995, 
Alesina and Angeletos 2005, Bénabou and Tirole 2006). These models show that it is 
possible to have multiple stable equilibria: an equilibrium in which levels of 
redistribution are low and people tend to believe that income is largely caused by effort, 
or an equilibrium in which levels of redistribution are high and people tend to believe that 
income is caused by circumstances beyond their control. There is also empirical evidence 
of a strong association between opposition to redistribution and beliefs that the poor are 
lazy rather than industrious.
4 This relationship emerges at both the cross-country level 
and the individual level within countries (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote 2001, Corneo 
and Grüner 2002); moreover, at the individual level, the relationship cannot be explained 
by missing measures of socioeconomic status (Fong 2001). In laboratory experiments 
using real payoffs, respondents give more to recipients who might be interpreted as 
having greater moral worth (Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith 1994, Eckel and 
Grossman 1996, Fong 2007, Durante and Putterman, 2008). Similarly, randomized 
survey experiments show substantially more support for government spending on “caring 
for the poor” or on “helping the poor” than on “welfare.” Political scientists have argued 
that this result supports the claim that people tend to judge welfare recipients as a 
particularly unworthy social category (Heclo 1986, Gilens 1999).  
For neither race nor fairness, however, is the supporting evidence based on studies 
that simultaneously use (i) real monetary transfers to the poor, (ii) randomized treatments 
of race and fairness, (iii) a nationally representative sample, and (iv) decision-making in a 
natural environment. We know of no evidence that is based on all four desiderata. In this 
paper, we present the results from, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to produce 
data based on the first three desiderata: behavioral measures of redistribution to the poor, 
random treatments of race and worthiness, and national representativeness. We see our 
paper as complementary evidence to field experiments, which typically meet all 
desiderata except the third (Frey and Meier 2004, Croson and Shang 2005, Landry et al. 
2006, Falk 2007, Karlan and List 2007, Eckel and Grossman 2008, DellaVigna, List, and 
Malmendier 2009, List and Price 2009, Meer 2009). 
                                                 
4 See Williamson (1974) for an early example of such a finding.   3
Our experiment is a dictator game in which the recipients are local charities that serve 
the poor in the city of Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Donors consist of approximately 1,000 
participants from a nationally representative respondent panel that is maintained by a 
private survey research firm, Knowledge Networks. We randomly manipulate the 
perceived race and worthiness of the charity recipients by showing respondents an 
audiovisual presentation about the recipients. Our “black” treatment shows photos mostly 
of black charity recipients while our “white” treatment shows photos mostly of white 
charity recipients. The photos are presented along with an audio story in which we 
manipulate perceptions of the worthiness of the charity recipients. We find that our 
treatments are successful – they have significant direct effects in the expected direction 
on perceptions of the race and worthiness of the recipients. We then give each respondent 
a ten percent chance of receiving $100. Prior to learning whether or not they will receive 
the $100, respondents must decide how much of that sum they would like to donate to the 
assigned charity in the event that they receive it. Finally, we collect survey data on a 
variety of attitudes and beliefs, including perceptions of the worthiness and race of the 
recipients. These perception measures are designed to test whether our treatments 
successfully manipulated beliefs about the recipients.  
Our experiment generates three main results. First, we find significant racial bias in 
perceptions of worthiness: respondents rate recipients of their own racial group as more 
worthy, and rate more worthy recipients as more likely to belong to their own racial 
group. Second, respondents give significantly more generously when the recipients are 
described as more worthy. In particular, audio treatments that raise the perceived fraction 
of worthy recipients by 15.2 percentage points cause the respondents to increase their 
giving by $11.0. This result, together with our finding of racial bias in perceptions of 
worthiness, may lead one to expect that respondents would also give more generously 
when shown pictures of recipients belonging to their own racial group. However, as our 
third result demonstrates, this is not the case; despite our successfully manipulating 
perceptions of race, respondents give about the same amount irrespective of the race of 
the recipients in the pictures. For instance, the non-black respondents give $61.0 on 
average when white recipients are shown and $58.9 on average when black recipients are 
shown. The difference of -$2.1 is not statistically significant (s.e. = 2.7) and relatively   4
small compared to the mean level of giving. Thus, while our respondents do rate ingroup 
members as more worthy, they appear to overcome this bias when it comes to giving. 
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 presents our experimental design, Section 3 
presents our results, and Section 4 concludes with our interpretation of our results. As we 
will explain in the conclusion, we do not believe that our failure to find racial bias in 
giving contradicts prior evidence of discrimination and racial group loyalty. First, racism 
may have been higher in the past. Second, there may be racial discrimination in the real 
world that our study fails to detect. Finally, even if there currently is no racial bias in 
individual preferences for redistribution, cumulative effects of prior discrimination may 
cause racial inequalities to persist. 
 
2.  Experimental Design 
 
Our experiment was fielded by Knowledge Networks, a market research firm founded by 
two Stanford political science professors. Knowledge Networks maintains a roughly 
nationally representative panel of respondents for use in both commercial and academic 
projects. Its respondents participate in surveys approximately once a week by Internet or 
Web TV. In exchange for their participation, Knowledge Networks panelists receive free 
Internet or WebTV access and receive the monetary incentives from some surveys. For 
example, our respondents received whatever monetary payoffs they earned from our 
experiment. Panelists are recruited through random-digit dialing and are then asked to 
join the Knowledge Networks panel.  
 In our experiment, we manipulate respondents’ perceptions of the poor. More 
specifically, we focus on perceptions of race and “worthiness” of recipients of two local 
charities in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. We accomplish this with a slide show that presents 
eight photographs along with two and a half minutes of audio. The slide show describes 
the city of Tuscaloosa, one of two randomly-assigned charities, and recipients of aid from 
that charity. Half of our respondents saw a slide show depicting the work of the Salvation 
Army in Tuscaloosa, and the other half saw a slide show depicting the work of 
Temporary Emergency Services in Tuscaloosa.    5
We took care to manipulate race perceptions in a way that minimized the likelihood 
that respondents would recognize the racial motivation of our study. Thus, we did not 
mention the issue of race in the audio part of our slide show. Instead, we manipulated 
perceptions of recipient race with the photographs. Half of our respondents saw photos 
mostly of black charity recipients, and the other half saw photos mostly of white charity 
recipients.
5 We made the backgrounds of the photos of blacks and whites as similar as 
possible (nearly identical in most cases) by taking the photos of blacks and whites in 
exactly the same location.  
The audio portion of our slide show is designed to manipulate perceptions of recipient 
worthiness and other characteristics. We avoid using deception by including different 
pieces of true information in different treatment conditions. For example, in our 
manipulation of the economic standing of Tuscaloosa, one treatment condition correctly 
states that the poverty rate in Tuscaloosa “is almost twice as high as the rest of the 
country,” and the other treatment condition correctly states that Tuscaloosa’s “per capita 
income … is more than 5% higher than the rest of the state.” Below we summarize our 
randomly assigned audio manipulations. The issues being manipulated are in bold text 
(with the fraction of participants assigned to each condition of the manipulation in 
parentheses). The treatment conditions for each manipulation are listed together with the 
values (0 or 1) we give them when they are used as dummy variables. With one 
exception, each randomized manipulation contains two conditions. The exception is the 
reasons for poverty and willingness to work manipulation, in which there are three 
conditions.
6 For each manipulation, each respondent was assigned to one and only one 
treatment condition. The exact wording of the audio conditions is provided in Appendix 
A.  
                                                 
5 We did not show pictures exclusively of one race because that might arouse suspicions among the 
respondents. Instead, in the black treatment condition, approximately 80% of the pictures are of blacks 
while in the white treatment condition approximately 80% of the pictures are of whites. 
6 In the reasons for poverty and willingness to work manipulation, we assigned 50% to the default 
condition in which we said nothing about the work ethic of the poor and said that the reasons for poverty 
are a mixture of factors including bad choices and circumstances beyond control. Among the other 50% of 
subjects, half were assigned to the Reason for poverty bad choices, not willing to work condition and half 
were assigned to the Reason for poverty beyond control, willing to work condition. The actual number of 
observations in each condition differs slightly from 50% or 25% because of non-response (see Section 3 for 
details about excluded participants). The actual fraction of participants in each treatment condition is 
presented in Table 1.   6
 
i)  City is Republican (50/50): 
0. “Compared to the rest of Alabama, more people in Tuscaloosa vote for the Democratic Party” 
1. “Like the rest of Alabama, people in Tuscaloosa vote overwhelmingly for the Republican Party” 
ii)  City is economically advantaged (50/50): 
0. “…with a poverty rate that is twice as high as in the rest of the country” 
1. “…with a per capita income that is more than 5% higher than the rest of the state”  
iii)  Reason for poverty and willingness to work (50/25/25): Many of the poor in Tuscaloosa are 
poor because of 
0. “…a mixture of factors including bad choices…and bad luck” and work ethic not mentioned 
1. “bad choices” and “many of them wish they could rely on more generous assistance” 
1. “circumstances beyond their control” and “many of them try to get a job…” 
iv)  Religious (50/50):  
0. [Nothing said] 
1. Many of the poor in Tuscaloosa “pray to God regularly to ask Him for help” 
v)  Salvation Army (50/50): The charity depicted is 
0. Temporary Emergency Services 
1. Salvation Army 
vi)  Short-term need for aid (50/50): Many of the charity’s recipients use its help 
0. “…for long periods of time” 
1. “…for short periods of time when it is absolutely necessary” 
vii) Currently working (50/50): the charity is busy “before people receive their next” 
0. “government benefits check” 
1. “paycheck” 
viii) Sharing own aid with others (50/50): “Many recipients are” 
0. “competitive about getting aid” 
1. “willing to share their allotment with others in need” 
ix)  Law-abiding (50/50): It is often hard for recipients to get well-paying jobs because “many 
employers are reluctant to hire” 
0. “people who have a criminal record” 
1. “them” 
 
Immediately following the slide show, we measure generosity to the poor in 
Tuscaloosa with actual giving to the charity depicted in the slide show. We explain that 
we will give $100 to one out of every ten participants in this study and ask respondents to 
decide how much of that money they would like to give to the Tuscaloosa charity.
7 That 
is, respondents had a 10% chance of playing a $100 dictator game with the Tuscaloosa 
charity. 
After respondents enter their dictator game decision, we ask a series of questions 
designed to check the effectiveness of our treatments. These questions measure 
perceptions of the charity recipients and all the residents of Tuscaloosa. For each 
                                                 
7 To credibly convey that each respondent had a 10 percent chance of being selected, we assigned each 
respondent a number between 0 and 9, and told him that his decision will be carried out if his assigned 
number is equal to the first number of the Louisiana State Pick3 lottery on a specified future date. 
Moreover, we told the respondent that the charity would send him a note specifying the amount of his 
donation. This was subsequently carried out as promised.   7
treatment condition, there is a perceptions question designed specifically to test its 
effectiveness. Finally, we conduct a survey of background characteristics and attitudes. 
This survey includes a variety of questions, including past charitable giving, attitudinal 
support for government transfers to the poor in Tuscaloosa, attitudinal support for 
charitable transfers to the poor in Tuscaloosa, preferences for government spending in 
general, beliefs about causes of poverty, perceptions of racial composition of charity 
recipients, social contact with people of other races, and attitudes about racial inequality 
of opportunity. 
 
3.  Results 
 
The experiment was fielded in 2006 from August 28 to September 20. A total of 1167 
respondents participated. We limit our sample to the 989 individuals who indicated that 
they could clearly hear the speaker in our audio presentation. An additional seven 
respondents did not answer the question about how much they would like to give during 
the experiment, so we also dropped these observations. Our final sample consists of 982 
respondents, of which 204 are black. Since we oversampled black respondents, we 
weight all of our results to correct for this oversampling. Appendix Table 1 compares the 
means and standard deviations of demographic variables in our Knowledge Networks 
data to those in the June 2006 Current Population Survey. The demographic means are 
roughly similar in magnitude even though there are significant differences in age, 
education, income, household structure, and marital status. There are no significant 
differences in the means of race, region, and work status dummies (except for a 
marginally significant difference in the fraction of respondents who are disabled).  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full weighted sample. The average 
donation was $58.7 (s.d. = $37.2), and roughly 11% of the respondents gave zero. About 
21% of the sample gave the median donation of $50, and about thirty-six percent of the 
respondents gave the full $100. The total payout from the experiment to the charities was 
$5995. Figure 1 presents the cumulative density function of giving during the experiment 
for the full weighted sample. Slightly more than 20% gave between zero and $50, and 
approximately 10% of the respondents gave between $50 and $100.   8
This fairly high level of giving in this experiment is not too surprising. In standard 
laboratory dictator games, in which students give anonymously to other students, average 
donations are around 10%-15% of the total (Camerer 2003). However, studies have 
shown that average offers in dictator games vary greatly due to a variety of factors. 
Factors that may have increased average giving in our experiment include social 
proximity, which can be increased by providing information about recipients (Bohnet and 
Frey 1999);
8 the perceived level of need of the recipients (Fong and Luttmer 2009); and 
our lottery method of assigning endowments to respondents, which may have decreased 
their sense of entitlement to the sum (Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith 1994). 
Since so many factors can affect the overall level of giving in dictator games, our interest 
lies exclusively in the marginal effects of our treatment conditions and background 
variables. We use the dictator game simply as a tool to obtain a measure of generosity 
towards the poor that is based on an actual, payoff-relevant choice. We therefore do not 
interpret average giving in this experiment as an estimate of the marginal propensity to 
give.  
 
3.1. Treatment effects on perceptions of charity recipients 
 
Tables 2a and 2b present the effects of our treatments on corresponding perceptions of 
the charity recipients and Tuscaloosa residents using the whole sample. This table shows 
that, by and large, our treatments successfully manipulated the perceptions they were 
designed to affect. Each column presents a regression where the outcome variable is one 
of the perception measures. The rows show the effects of our treatments on each of these 
perceptions. 
Row (a) shows the effect of presenting photos of black charity recipients. We 
expected the black photos to have positive effects in columns 1 and 10. The outcome 
variable in these columns is the perceived percentage of people who are black minus 
perceived percentage who are white, where the people in question are aid recipients 
(column 1) and Tuscaloosa residents (column 10). As depicted in column 1, black photos 
increase the perceived fraction of charity recipients who are black-minus-white by 21.8 
                                                 
8 See also Small and Loewenstein (2003) for related work on the “identifiable victim effect.”   9
percentage points. This effect is significant at the one-percent level and establishes that 
our treatments successfully manipulated perceptions of recipient race. In column 10, the 
effect of black photos on the perceived fraction of Tuscaloosa residents who are black-
minus-white is 15.3 percentage points and is also significant at the one-percent level.  
Row (a) also shows that black photos have highly significant negative effects on 
perceptions about the worthiness of the charity recipients. Columns 2 through 4 present 
regressions where the outcome variables are perceptions of worthiness. These columns 
show that the black photos have highly significant negative effects on beliefs that the 
recipients were: (2a) “willing to work hard in order to get ahead in life”, (2b) “poor 
mainly because of reasons beyond their control”, and (2c) not “poor mainly because of 
bad choices in their personal lives.”
9 Column 3 shows that the black photos had a highly 
significant negative effect on beliefs that the recipients have no criminal record, while 
column 4 shows that black photos had a negative, but insignificant, effect on perceptions 
that recipients are willing to share their aid with others. As we will show in Table 3 
below, the negative effect of black photos on perceived recipient worthiness is driven 
entirely by the non-blacks in our sample; among blacks, the effect of black photos on 
perceived recipient worthiness is small and insignificant. Hence, these results offer a first 
indication of our finding of racial bias in perceptions of worthiness. 
Rows (b) and (c) show the effects of the first two worthiness treatments. Row (b) 
shows the effects of describing recipients as poor for reasons beyond their control and 
being willing to work. Row (c) presents the effects of describing recipients as being poor 
because of bad choices and not very interested in working hard. The omitted control 
treatment for rows (b) and (c) described recipients as poor because of a mixture of bad 
choices and circumstances beyond control and did not mention work ethic. The treatment 
presented in row (b) occurred in 25% of the cases, the treatment presented in row (c) 
occurred in another 25% of the cases, and the omitted control condition occurred in the 
remaining 50% of the cases. The worthiness perceptions that are the dependent variables 
in columns 2a through 2c were designed specifically to test the effectiveness of these two 
worthiness treatments. We expect the treatment in row (b) to have positive effects in 
                                                 
9 The outcome in columns (2c) and (3) are reverse coded from the wording in the survey. See Appendix A 
for original question wording.   10
columns 2a through 2c and the treatment in row (c) to have negative effects in these 
columns. As expected, the effects of the worthiness treatment presented in row (b) are 
positive and highly significant in columns 2a through 2c. Furthermore, in column 3, we 
find that this treatment has a highly significant positive effect on perceptions that the 
recipients have no criminal record. The worthiness treatment presented in row (c) has 
negative effects (as expected) in columns 2a through 2c. The effect is highly significant 
in column 2a, marginally significant in column 2c, and insignificant in column 2b. 
Rows (d) and (e) present the effects of the other two worthiness treatments: 
describing recipients as, respectively, law-abiding and willing to share the aid they 
receive with others. As expected, the law-abiding treatment has a highly significant 
positive effect on perceptions that recipients have no criminal record, and the willing-to-
share treatment has a highly significant positive effect on perceptions that recipients are 
willing to share their aid with others. In addition, these treatments have positive effects 
on other perceptions of worthiness (columns 2a-2c) which are significant at the five-
percent level in three cases and the ten-percent level in one case. Together, rows (b) 
through (e) establish that out treatments successfully manipulated perceptions of recipient 
worthiness. 
Rows (f) through (h) present the effects of describing recipients as, respectively, 
needing short-term aid, currently working, and religious. These treatments correspond to 
perceptions measures that are ultimately relatively poorly explained. The R
2 statistics in 
the columns explaining perceptions about recipients needing short-term aid, currently 
working, and being religious are the lowest among those in Table 2, ranging from 0.04 to 
0.06. Nonetheless, the short-term need for aid treatment has a highly significant positive 
effect on perceptions that recipients need short-term aid. The religious treatment is also 
successful with a highly significant positive effect on both perceptions that the recipients 
are religious and perceptions that the recipients are Republican.  
Row (i) shows that describing Tuscaloosa as having Republican leanings significantly 
increases perceptions that the recipients are Republican. Row (j) presents the effects of 
stating that the city of Tuscaloosa is economically advantaged. As expected, this 
treatment has a highly significant positive effect on the perceived incomes of Tuscaloosa 
residents (col. 11), and it even affects the perceived income of the charity recipients (col.   11
9). It also causes respondents to perceive a significantly lower fraction of city residents 
who are black-minus-white (column 10) and an insignificantly lower fraction of charity 
recipients who are black-minus-white (column 1). Finally, this treatment has a significant 
negative effect on perceptions that the recipients are Republican (col. 8).   
Lastly, the row labeled “Black respondent” shows that in many columns, black 
respondents have significantly different perceptions than non-black respondents about 
charity recipients and Tuscaloosa residents. Compared to whites, black respondents 
perceive significantly fewer black charity recipients (col. 1) and perceive recipients as 
significantly more worthy (col. 2a-2c), but also less likely to be Republican (col. 8) and 
less economically advantaged (col. 9). Black respondents also perceive a significantly 
lower annual income for Tuscaloosa residents than whites perceive (col. 11). 
Table 3 breaks out the sample by respondent race to further investigate the effects of 
our race and worthiness treatments on perceptions of the race and worthiness of the 
charity recipients. We present results for the whole sample (col. 1), the sample of non-
black respondents (col. 2), and the sample of black respondents (col. 3). Column 4 
presents the results for the whole sample from a regression that includes an interaction 
term between respondent race and the race treatment and an interaction term between 
respondent race and the number of worthiness treatments. In this table, we use composite 
measures of the worthiness treatments and the worthiness perceptions. Recall from Table 
2 that the worthiness treatments had effects on worthiness perceptions in the expected 
directions. Our composite measures of worthiness treatments and perceptions help us 
summarize these effects more compactly and give us more statistical power. 
Our composite measure of worthiness treatments is the average number of worthiness 
treatments that the respondent was exposed to. There are four audio worthiness 
treatments: i) that poverty in Tuscaloosa is caused by bad choices, ii) that poverty in 
Tuscaloosa is caused by circumstances beyond individual control, iii) that the charity’s 
recipients are law-abiding, and iv) that the charity’s recipients are willing to share their 
own aid.
10 Our derived measure of the mean of these treatments ranges from zero to one, 
                                                 
10 The treatments not included in this measure were designed to manipulate perceptions other than 
worthiness – namely, perceptions about financial need and perceptions about background characteristics 
that we hypothesized might lead to social group loyalty.   12
decreases by .25 for those who are assigned to (i) and increases by .25 for each of the 
conditions (ii), (iii) and (iv) to which a respondent is assigned. 
 Our composite measure of worthiness perceptions is the average of the responses to 
the five worthiness perceptions questions. There were five worthiness perceptions 
questions; namely the percentage of the charity’s recipients who i) are poor mainly 
because of bad choices (reverse coded), ii) are poor because of reasons beyond individual 
control, iii) are willing to work hard in order to get ahead in life, iv) have a criminal 
record (reverse coded), and v) are willing to share their own aid.
11 Our composite 
measure of worthiness perceptions is the average of these questions and ranges from zero 
to 100.  
Panel A presents regressions where the outcome variable is perceptions of the fraction 
of charity recipients who are black minus the fraction white. In every column of Panel A, 
the black photo treatment has a highly significant positive effect on the perceived fraction 
of charity recipients who are black-minus-white, with effects ranging from 21 to 29 
percentage points. This confirms our conclusion from Table 2 that the race treatment 
successfully manipulated perceptions of race. The second row of Panel A presents the 
effect of the number of worthiness treatments on the racial perception variable. In the 
sample of black respondents, the number of worthiness perceptions has a marginally 
significant positive effect at the ten-percent level on the perceived percentage of black-
minus-white aid recipients, while this effect is negative, but insignificant, for white 
respondents. Column 4 shows a significant interaction between the number of worthiness 
manipulations and respondent race, which indicates that the effect of the worthiness 
treatments is significantly different for black and non-black respondents. According to 
this interaction effect, people are more likely to think of worthy recipients as coming 
from their own racial group. This constitutes the first component of evidence for our first 
main finding, namely the existence of racial bias in perceptions.  
Panel B presents regressions where the outcome variable is perceptions of the 
worthiness of the charity recipients. The first row shows that among non-blacks, black 
                                                 
11 The perceptions measures not included in this worthiness perceptions measure correspond to treatment 
conditions not included in the worthiness manipulation measure. These perceptions questions were 
designed to check the effectiveness of treatments intended to manipulate financial need and background 
characteristics other than worthiness.   13
photos have a highly significant negative effect on the perception of worthiness. In 
contrast, among blacks, black photos have a small and insignificant effect on the 
perception of worthiness. Moreover, column 4 shows that the interaction between 
respondent race and the black photo treatment is statistically significant. That is, black 
respondents seeing black photos rate aid recipients as more worthy than non-black 
respondents do, and this difference is statistically significant. This interaction effect 
mirrors the finding in Panel A of a significant interaction effect between respondent race 
and the number of worthiness treatments on race perceptions, and constitutes the second 
component of evidence for our first main finding, namely the existence of racial bias in 
perceptions. Row 2 of Panel B shows that in all columns, the worthiness treatments have 
significant positive effects on the perceived worthiness of the recipients, confirming our 
conclusion from Table 2 that our treatment successfully manipulated worthiness 
perceptions. In addition, non-black respondents’ perceptions of worthiness are 
significantly more sensitive to our worthiness manipulations than the perceptions of black 
respondents, which would be consistent with non-blacks’ being less familiar with aid 
recipients, and therefore having weaker priors about them.  
Table 3 establishes our first main result – the existence of racial group loyalty bias in 
perceptions of worthiness of the recipients. Panel A shows that blacks who hear that the 
recipients are worthy are more likely than non-blacks who hear the same information to 
perceive that the recipients shown in the photos are black. Analogously, Panel B shows 
that blacks view black recipients as more worthy than white recipients while non-blacks 
view white recipients as more worthy. These findings are consistent with findings from 
the social categorization literature in social psychology suggesting that people tend to 
hold out-group members individually responsible for their own poor outcomes while 
people tend to attribute poor outcomes of “in-group” members to adverse external 
circumstances (Brewer and Miller 1996). 
In the following sub-section we will examine the effects of our treatments on giving. 
We will show that while there are robust significant effects of the worthiness treatments 
on giving, there is no effect of recipient race on giving. Thus, while we find a form of 
racial group loyalty in perceptions about the worthiness of recipients, this bias does not 
translate into racial group loyalty in donations.    14
 
3.2.   Treatment effects on giving  
 
Table 4 presents OLS regressions of giving in our experiment on our treatment conditions 
and demographic controls. The first column presents the effects of each treatment 
condition in the whole sample. The first row shows that the effect of the black photos is 
-$2.2 with a standard error of $2.3. This treatment effect is less than 4% of the mean offer 
of $59 (see Table 1). The 95%-confidence interval on this effect is -$6.7 to $2.3. Thus, at 
this level of confidence, we cannot rule out a negative effect of black photos of 11% of 
the $59 mean. The next four rows of coefficients along with standard errors in column 1 
present the effects of the worthiness treatments. When the worthiness treatments are 
included separately, their effects are generally in the expected direction, but only the 
“shares own aid with others” treatment has a statistically significant effect on giving. 
Finally, the remaining treatment conditions have small and statistically insignificant 
effects.  
In the second column, we show the effect of the average of the four worthiness 
treatments rather than showing the effect of each worthiness treatment separately. We 
find that the combined effect of the worthiness treatments is positive and significant at 
the five-percent level. Respondents who hear four worthiness treatments describing the 
recipients as worthy give, on average, $11.0 more than those who hear the four 
alternative treatments that describe recipients as unworthy. This establishes our second 
main result, namely that there is a causal effect of perceived worthiness on giving. 
Columns 3 and 4 present the same regression as in column 2, but separately for non-
black and black respondents, respectively. In both columns the effect of black photos is 
small and statistically insignificant, but relatively precisely estimated. The effect of the 
worthiness treatments is positive and statistically significant for non-black respondents 
but negative and not statistically significant for black respondents. This null finding 
among blacks may reflect the fact that, among blacks, the number of worthiness 
treatments has a weaker effect on worthiness perceptions than among non-blacks (see 
Table 3). None of the other treatment effects are significant at the 5 percent level.   15
Finally, column 5 presents a regression of giving on the same variables as in columns 
3 and 4 but with interaction effects included, using the whole sample. As with the other 
regressions, this column shows a small, statistically insignificant, and relatively precisely 
estimated effect of the race treatment. The combined effect of the worthiness treatments 
is $13.4 and is significant at the five-percent level. Neither of the interaction effects and 
none of the other treatment effects are significant at the five-percent level or better.
12  
This column establishes our third main result – the absence of significant racial bias in 
giving. Both the main effect of the black picture treatment and the interaction effect of 
the black picture treatment with black respondent are relatively small in magnitude, and 
neither is statistically significant. The main effect, which is more precisely estimated than 
the interaction effect, indicates that non-black respondents give -$2.3 less after seeing 
black pictures, with a 95%-confidence interval from -$7.3 to $2.8. The interaction effect 
of $0.4 indicates that the reaction of black respondents to the black picture treatments is 
almost identical to the reaction of non-blacks, though the standard error of $5.3 limits our 
ability to detect moderate amounts of racial bias.  
Table 5 examines the effects of race and worthiness perceptions (as opposed to 
treatments) on giving. The independent variables here are identical to the dependent 
variables in Table 3 and are measured on scales from 0 to 100. Columns 1 and 3 present 
OLS regressions of giving on the perceived fraction of welfare recipients who are black-
minus-white and the average response to the five worthiness perceptions questions, 
controlling for the other treatments and demographic variables. Note that these measures 
may be endogenous to respondents’ donation decisions because i) perceptions may have 
formed in response to unobserved variables that also affect giving and ii) we measure 
perceptions after respondents decide how much to give to the recipients so stated 
preferences may to some extent merely reflect behavior rather than cause it. Thus, in 
                                                 
12 There is a marginally significant negative interaction effect between the number of worthiness treatments 
and respondent race in column (4), corresponding to the finding in columns (2) and (3) that among non-
blacks there is a significant positive effect of the number of worthiness treatments while among blacks, 
there is no significant effect. This is analogous to findings reported elsewhere that groups with lower 
socioeconomic status, including non-whites compared to whites, place a lower monetary value on 
redistributing resources on the basis of recipient “worthiness” (Corneo and Fong 2008). This lower 
monetary value of justice for non-whites and other low SES groups is driven by the finding that the effect 
of beliefs that bad choices (rather than bad luck) cause poverty on opposition to redistribution is smaller in 
absolute value for non-whites and other lower-SES groups than it is for whites and other higher-SES 
groups.   16
columns 2 and 4, we present instrumental variables estimates of the effects of exogenous 
race and worthiness perceptions. Here, we instrument the race and worthiness perceptions 
measures with the black photo treatment and the worthiness treatments.  
Columns 1 and 2 present the OLS and IV estimates in the sample of non-blacks. We 
use this sample because we found that both the race and worthiness treatments had 
statistically significant effects on the corresponding perceptions measures in Table 3 
among non-blacks (in the black sample, only the race treatment had significant effects). 
Additionally, only in the non-black sample did the worthiness treatments have a 
significant effect on giving in Table 4. Finally, an important policy concern is non-black 
discrimination against blacks. We have greater statistical power to detect such an effect in 
the sample of non-blacks than in the whole sample.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 indicate that the effects of both endogenous and 
exogenous perceptions of recipient race on giving are close to zero and statistically 
insignificant. If the perceived fraction of recipients who are black minus the perceived 
fraction who are white increases by ten percentage points, giving in our experiment is 
unchanged in column (1) with a 95%-confidence interval of -$0.8 to $0.8. In column 2, a 
ten-percentage point increase in our racial perceptions measure increases giving by $0.7 
with a 95%-confidence interval of -$2.1 to $3.6. Recall that these results are from giving 
out of a total amount of $100, where the mean gift is about $60. In contrast, both the OLS 
and the IV estimates of the worthiness perceptions are positive and significant (at the 
one- and five-percent levels, respectively). The IV estimate is noteworthy in at least two 
respects. First, it allows us to scale the effect of the worthiness treatments in terms of 
worthiness perceptions, and this reveals that the treatment effect is large in economic 
terms: a ten percentage point increase in the average perceived worthiness of recipients 
increases giving by $8.6. Second, the IV estimate is larger than the OLS estimate. Our 
interpretation of this finding is that the worthiness perceptions measures are likely poorly 
measured. If there is measurement error, then the OLS estimates are biased toward zero. 
The IV estimates, in contrast, do not suffer from attenuation bias induced by 
measurement error. Thus, our IV estimates address both the endogeneity and 
measurement error problems that are likely to be present in the OLS estimates.    17
Columns 3 and 4 present OLS and IV estimates in the whole sample, with the race 
and worthiness perceptions measures interacted with respondent race. The first two rows 
show the effects of the race and worthiness perceptions on giving among non-blacks. As 
expected, both the OLS and IV estimates are similar to those of columns 1 and 2. The 
third and fourth rows present the interactions between the perceptions variables and a 
dummy for a black respondent. The interaction terms show that the effects of the 
perceptions variables among blacks are smaller than these same effects among non-
blacks, but these differences are not statistically significant.  
 
3.3. Robustness checks 
 
In Table 6, we investigate the robustness of the two main results from Table 4 – namely 
that recipient race has a statistically insignificant effect on giving and that the combined 
effect of our worthiness manipulations has a significant positive effect. As before, we 
focus on the results for non-blacks because (i) this sample provides the most statistical 
power to detect racial bias in giving against blacks and (ii) the effect of worthiness on 
giving was driven by the non-black subsample. Each row of Table 6 presents a single 
regression of giving in our experiment on the black photo treatment and the average 
number of worthiness treatments. The first row reproduces the regression that was 
presented in column 3 of Table 4. Using the sample of non-black respondents, this 
baseline regresses giving in our experiment on the black photo treatment, the average 
number of worthiness treatments, dummies for the remaining treatments, and 
demographic controls. Each subsequent row presents a regression that is identical to the 
baseline regression in all but one respect. The second row is identical to the first except 
that it uses the whole sample. The third row uses whites only. The specifications and 
samples in rows 4 and 5 are the same as in row 1, except that they use ordered probit and 
censored regression, respectively. Rows 6 and 7 are the same as row 1 except that row 6 
omits the demographic controls while row 7 includes additional controls. The additional 
controls included in row 7 are the perceived effectiveness of the charity (measured as the 
fraction of dollars donated to the charity that reach needy recipients), the self-reported 
importance of “helping others in need”, and the self-reported importance of “earning a lot   18
of money”. These additional controls are not included in our baseline regression because 
they could be endogenous. Rows 8, 9, and 10 are the same as row 1 except that the 
dependent variables are, respectively, hypothetical giving, self-reported preference for 
government spending on the poor in Tuscaloosa, and self-reported preference for 
charitable spending on the poor in Tuscaloosa. 
The first column of Table 6 presents the effect of the black photo treatment in each of 
these regressions. In every case, the effect of the race treatment is small and statistically 
insignificant. Column 2 presents the effects of the average number of worthiness 
treatments. In rows 1-7, where the dependent variable is giving in the experiment, the 
effect of the number of worthiness treatments is positive and significant at the five- or 
one-percent level. In the OLS regressions where the outcome variable is giving, the 
magnitude of the effect of hearing four worthiness treatments compared to hearing none 
of them ranges from $11 to $16; while in the censored regression, the magnitude is $25.4. 
In rows 8-10, the outcome variables are the non-behavioral measures of generosity to 
charity recipients. The number of worthiness manipulations has a significant effect on 
support for government spending on the poor in Tuscaloosa (row 9), but no significant 
effect on hypothetical charitable giving (row 8). The effect of the number of worthiness 
manipulations on self-reported preferences for charitable spending on the poor in 
Tuscaloosa (row 10) was just short of marginally significant with a p-value of 0.104. 
Recall that for these alternative dependent variables, there is no evidence of racial bias, 
either. 
 
3.4. External validity check 
 
How well might the results of our experiment generalize to natural giving outside of the 
experiment? One way to investigate the external validity of our result is to estimate the 
extent to which giving in our experiment corresponds to total charitable giving in the 
previous calendar year. In unreported results, we find that total charitable giving in 2005 
has a statistically significant positive effect on giving in the experiment. However, a 
drawback of this simple regression is that measurement error in charitable giving leads 
attenuation bias in the estimated effect. Hence, it does not provide a good estimate of the   19
sensitivity of giving in the experiment to total charitable giving. As a validity check that 
circumvents attenuation bias from measurement error, we investigate whether 
demographic characteristics that predict total charitable giving in 2005 similarly predict 
giving in our experiment. Table 7 presents this analysis. 
Column 1 regresses giving during our experiment measured in dollars on respondent 
demographic characteristics. Column 2 regresses a transformed measure of total 
charitable giving in 2005 on the same demographic characteristics included in column 1. 
To make the dependent measures in columns 1 and 2 comparable, we first topcode total 
charitable giving in 2005 at $500 so that the fraction of people giving the maximum 
amount is equal across the two measures. Then we divide total charitable giving in 2005 
by 5 so that both giving measures range from zero to 100. The key result from columns 1 
and 2 is that the explanatory power of the demographic variables is higher in column 2 
than in column 1. Moreover, the coefficients in column 2 tend to have a larger absolute 
value than the coefficients in column 1, and the percent of the variation in giving that is 
explained by the demographic variables is roughly two times higher in column 2 (R
2 = 
.208) than in column 1 (R
2 = .098). This is a first indication that giving during the 
experiment is somewhat less responsive to demographics that actual past charitable 
giving. 
The regressions in columns 1 and 2 show that the demographic variables tend to have 
effects in the same direction on giving in our experiment and on past charitable giving; 
we do not see any demographic variables that have a significant positive effect in one of 
the columns and a significant negative effect in the other. However, since many of the 
demographic variables are highly correlated with each other, we investigate this general 
pattern in more detail in columns (3) and (4). We predict each type of giving with the 
demographic variables and then estimate the effect of: i) predicted total charitable giving 
in 2005 on actual giving during the experiment (column 3) and ii) predicted giving during 
the experiment on actual total charitable giving in 2005 (column 4). That is, we regress 
each type of giving on the linear combination of demographic variables that best predicts 
the other type of giving. This is a check of how well the combination of demographic 
variables that best explains one type of giving explains the other type of giving.   20
Column 3 shows that if predicted charitable giving in 2005 increases by one, then 
actual giving in our experiment increases by $0.43. That is, giving in the experiment is 
43% as responsive as past charitable giving to the demographics that predict charitable 
giving. Column 4 estimates this responsiveness by regressing charitable giving in 2005 
on predicted giving in the experiment. This estimate says that past charitable giving is 
118% as responsive as giving in our experiment to the demographic variables that predict 
giving in the experiment, or, inversely, that giving in the experiment is 85% as responsive 
to the demographic variables as past charitable giving. In summary, giving in our 
experiment is somewhere between 43% and 85% as sensitive to the demographic 
variables as charitable giving in the real world. These results suggest that perceptions of 
the worthiness of the poor may also have a greater effect on charitable giving in the real 




In this paper, we presented the results from an experiment that examines how charitable 
giving to the poor responds to the perceived race and worthiness of charity recipients. 
The experiment was conducted on a sample of about 1000 respondents that is broadly 
representative of the U.S. adult population. We showed an audiovisual presentation about 
a charity, the charity’s recipients, and the city in which recipients were located to 
manipulate respondents’ perceptions of recipient race and worthiness. Following the 
presentation, the respondents decided how to distribute $100 between themselves and the 
charity. Subsequently, we asked the respondents about their perceptions of the race and 
worthiness of the charity’s recipients, which confirmed that our treatments successfully 
manipulated the respondents’ perceptions. 
The experiment yielded three main results. First, we find a racial group loyalty effect 
on perceptions: respondents rate recipients as more worthy when shown pictures of 
recipients from their own racial group, and conversely, they perceive a higher fraction of 
recipients from their own racial group if the audio story describes recipients in more 
worthy terms. Second, respondents give significantly more if our audio treatment causes 
them to perceive the recipients as more worthy. Moreover, this effect is also large in   21
economic terms; audio treatments that raise the perceived fraction of worthy recipients by 
10 percentage points cause the respondents to increase their giving by $7.2 relative to a 
mean level of giving of $58.7. Third, we find no significant racial bias in giving. The race 
of the recipients shown in the pictures, while highly influential on race perceptions, did 
not significantly affect giving in the whole sample or in subsamples by respondent race. 
Moreover, black and non-black respondents also did not respond significantly differently 
in their giving upon to seeing pictures of black recipients. However, given the statistical 
precision of our estimates, we cannot rule out a moderate amount of racial bias, but we 
can rule out at the 5% level that seeing pictures of black recipients causes non-black 
respondents to decrease giving by more than $7.4 on a mean of $60.0.  
We do not believe that our failure to find racial discrimination in giving contradicts 
prior evidence of discrimination and racial group loyalty. There are at least three reasons 
for this. First, our evidence is from a different time period than prior evidence on racial 
effects in individual demands for redistribution. It is possible that racial effects may be 
lower now simply because racism in general has been decreasing over time in the United 
States. Racial effects may also be lower now than at other times because of domain-
specific reasons: Much of the evidence of racial discrimination in redistributive politics in 
the United States comes from times when there was public anger about the former AFDC 
program and debate about welfare reform (see, e.g., Gilens 1999). It seems plausible that 
during politically turbulent times in countries where racial minorities belong to lower 
socioeconomic classes, racial discrimination can flare up naturally or even be 
manufactured by political entrepreneurs (Glaeser 2005). Second, there may be racial 
discrimination in individual demands for redistribution that our study does not detect. 
Our results are not precise enough to rule out moderate amounts of racial discrimination. 
Furthermore, despite the methodological advantages of our study – namely, using 
randomly varied perceptions as the independent variables and real behavior as the 
outcome variable – there are some disadvantages. In particular, respondents in our study 
were forced to make their donation decisions in a somewhat artificial setting, and they 
may have also suspected that they were being studied. Both of these factors may have 
affected our results. Third, even if there were currently no racial biases in individual 
charitable behavior and individual demands for redistribution, it seems likely that racial   22
inequality in socioeconomic outcomes would persist as a legacy from prior 
discrimination. That is, merely avoiding discriminatory behavior in one instance, or even 
ending it more broadly, seems unlikely to erase the cumulative effects of prior 
discrimination. Thus, a lack of racial discrimination in our research does not imply that 
racial discrimination in society has been eradicated or that racial inequality is a smaller 
problem than previously thought.   23
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Appendix A: Charity Survey Instrument 
 
•  Text that is notes is bold and in brackets. Text that is the name of a question or a variable name is in 
brackets and capital letters.  
•  Audio text that respondents hear is in italics; all other text the respondents read. 
•  For multiple choice questions they were given radio buttons to click on, in this appendix that feature 
shows up as numbered options [1], [2], [3], this is different from audio treatments which are 
distinguished (0), (1).  
•  Separating lines correspond to new screens.  
•  [CHARITY] was replaced in both the text and the audio with either the words “Salvation Army” or the 
words “Temporary Emergency Services” depending on the treatment.  
•  There are a total of 11 experimental treatments: [CHARITY], the name of the charity shown in the 
presentation, [BLACK PICTURE], the predominant race of the people shown in the pictures, and the 
nine audio treatments: (1) [CITY IS REPUBLICAN], (2) [CITY IS ECONOMICALLY ADVANTAGED], (3) 
[REASON FOR POVERTY BEYOND CONTROL], (4) [REASON FOR POVERTY BAD CHOICE], (5) 
[RELIGIOUS], (6) [SHORT-TERM NEED FOR AID], (7) [CURRENTLY WORKING], (8) [WILLING TO SHARE 
OWN AID WITH OTHERS], and (9) [LAW-ABIDING]. 
 
 
-- Main Questionnaire -- 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
This is a study conducted by researchers at Carnegie Mellon University and Harvard University. The general topic 
is assistance to the poor and other issues facing America. 
 
Thank you for your participation!  
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
PART I. BACKGROUND ABOUT THE WORK OF A FOOD PANTRY IN [TOWN] 
Presentation about [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa, AL 
Shortly, you will see a brief presentation about the work of [CHARITY] in [TOWN], AL.  
 
Please have the volume on your computer or TV adjusted so that you can clearly hear the speaker's voice 
that goes with the slides. 
 
To respect their privacy, we have obscured the identities of the people shown in the slides. 
 
During the presentation, the "Continue" button only becomes active after the speaker has finished. 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[Respondents view first pair of pictures. These are two pictures of the city of Tuscaloosa itself, shown 
side by side. The first picture is the same independent of the black picture treatment. (It shows a black 
and a white cyclist in the background). In the second picture, a black passerby is shown in the black 
picture treatment and a white passerby otherwise. Respondents hear the following audio text.] 
 
The City of Tuscaloosa, AL 
This is a slide show about Tuscaloosa, some of its poor people, and a charity that helps them. Tuscaloosa is a 
small city in Alabama.  
 
[CITY IS REPUBLICAN]: 
0. Compared to the rest of Alabama more people in Tuscaloosa vote for the Democratic Party 
1. Like the rest of Alabama, people in Tuscaloosa vote overwhelmingly for the Republican Party  
 
[CITY IS ECONOMICALLY ADVANTAGED]: 
0. Tuscaloosa is relatively disadvantaged, with a poverty rate that is almost twice as high as in the rest of 
the country. 
1. Tuscaloosa is relatively advantaged, with a per capita income that is more than 5% higher than the rest 
of the state.    27
 
To respect their privacy, we have obscured the identities of the people in the photographs. 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[Respondents view second pair of pictures, again shown side by side. The first picture shows a person 
entering a thrift store. This person is black in the black picture treatment and white otherwise. The second 
picture shows two individuals, one black and one white, inside the thrifts store. Respondents hear the 
following audio text.] 
 
The Poor in Tuscaloosa 
Many poor people in Tuscaloosa receive both welfare from the government and food and other goods from a 
variety of charities. 
 
[If REASON FOR POVERTY BEYOND CONTROL=0 and REASON FOR POVERTY BAD CHOICE=1]:  
Many of these people use welfare and charitable assistance because of bad choices in their personal 
lives such as lack of effort or substance abuse. 
 
Generally the recipients are unhappy about their situation and wish they had more money. 
 
Many of them wish they could rely on more generous assistance from the government and charities. 
 
[If REASON FOR POVERTY BEYOND CONTROL=1 and REASON FOR POVERTY BAD CHOICE=0]: 
Many of these people use welfare and charitable assistance because of circumstances beyond their 
control such as bad luck. 
 
Generally the recipients are unhappy about their situation and wish they had more money. 
 
Many of them try to get a job that pays enough for them to stand on their own feet and no longer rely on 
assistance from the government and charities. 
 
[If REASON FOR POVERTY BEYOND CONTROL=0 and REASON FOR POVERTY BAD CHOICE=0]: 
The reasons why these people use government welfare and charitable assistance vary widely. Often it is 
a mixture of factors including bad choices in their personal lives such as lack of effort or substance abuse, 
and circumstances beyond their control such as bad luck. 
 
Generally the recipients are unhappy about their situation and wish they had more money. 
 
[Note the combination REASON FOR POVERTY BEYOND CONTROL=1 and REASON FOR POVERTY BAD 
CHOICE=1 does not occur] 
 
[RELIGIOUS]: 
0. [NOTHING SAID] 
1. Many of them pray to God regularly to ask Him for help. 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[Respondents view third pair of pictures, again shown side by side. Both pictures are of people receiving 
aid from [CHARITY]. Under the black picture treatment, all individuals shown are black. Otherwise, all 
individuals shown are white. Respondents hear the following audio text.] 
 
The work of [CHARITY] 
[CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa is one of the charities that help welfare recipients and other poor people in Tuscaloosa.  
 
[SHORT-TERM NEED FOR AID]  
0. It provides food and other goods to the poor, many of whom use this kind of help for long periods of 
time. 
1. It provides food and other goods to the poor, many of whom only use this kind of help for short periods 
of time when it is absolutely necessary. 
 
[CURRENTLY WORKING]: 
0. Providing enough assistance is more difficult on the busy days just before many people will receive 
their next government benefit check.    28
1. Providing enough assistance is more difficult on the busy days just before many people will receive 
their next paycheck.  
 
[WILLING TO SHARE OWN AID WITH OTHERS]:  
0. During these busy days, many of the usual recipients get worried and become competitive with others 
in line for assistance. 
1. During these busy days, many of the usual recipients get worried, but they are willing to share some of 
their allotment with others in need.  
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[Respondents view third pair of pictures, again shown side by side. Both pictures are of people receiving 
aid from [CHARITY]. Under the black picture treatment, all individuals shown are black. Otherwise, all 
individuals shown are white. Respondents hear the following audio text.] 
 
The people that receive help from [CHARITY] 
Ideally, the recipients will obtain jobs that pay well enough that they no longer need assistance from charities, but 
in practice this is often hard for a variety of reasons. 
 
[LAW-ABIDING]:  
0. For example, many employers are reluctant to hire people who have a criminal record.  
1. For example, many employers are reluctant to hire them.  
 
In the meantime, organizations like [CHARITY] provide crucial assistance to welfare recipients and other poor 
people in Tuscaloosa. [CHARITY] couldn’t achieve this without many generous charitable contributions and help 
from volunteers. 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[SOUND CHECK] How well could you hear the speaker's voice in the presentation you just saw? 
I didn't hear any sound...........................................................................................................................[1] 
I heard some sound but couldn't understand what she was saying.......................................................[2] 
The speaker's voice was clear and understandable  .............................................................................[3] 
 
[IF RESPONDENT SELECTS 1 (“DIDN’T HEAR ANY SOUND”) OR 2 (“COULDN’T UNDERSTAND WHAT SHE WAS SAYING”) 
SURVEY SKIPS TO DISPLAY SCREEN AT THE BEGINNING OF PART IV.  
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
PART II. DECISION-MAKING TASK 
 
Decision-making task 
Now, you are going to make a decision involving [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa. Please note that all information we 
give you is true and all payments will be made exactly as stated. Please think carefully about your decision 
because one out of every 10 participants in this study will have his or her decision carried out with real money.  
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
We will give $100 to one out of every 10 participants in this study. We ask you to decide in advance how much of 
this $100, if any, you would like to give to [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa. You can give any amount you wish, including 
nothing. If you are selected, this $100 is yours, and you are free to keep or to give away any amount you wish, 
including nothing. While many people give some away, we expect that most people will keep at least some of this 
amount for themselves. 
 
If you are randomly selected to receive $100, we will send the amount that you want to donate, if any, to 
[CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa. The amount that you decide to keep for yourself will be credited to your Knowledge 
Networks account (you get 1000 bonus points for each dollar you decide to keep).  
 
If you decide to donate money, [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa will mail you a note to confirm that we sent them exactly 
the amount you specified. 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
The random selection works as follows. If the first number of the Pick3 draw of the Louisiana State Lottery on 
[LOTTERYDATE] is [LOTTERYNUMBER], then we will carry out your decision. Because numbers in the Pick3 game 
lie between 0 and 9, you have a 1 in 10 chance that we will carry out your decision. If you wish, you will be able to 
find the winning number on http://www.louisianalottery.com. However, this is not necessary. If your number is 
drawn, we will automatically carry out your decision. 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────   29
[GIVING DURING EXPERIMENT] Now, please decide how much of your $100 you want to give to [CHARITY] for 
its services to welfare recipients and other poor people in Tuscaloosa in the event that you are randomly selected 
to receive $100. 
 
If the first number of the Pick3 draw on [LOTTERYDATE] is [LOTTERYNUMBER],  
 
I want $_______ to be sent to [CHARITY] for its services to welfare recipients and other poor people in 
Tuscaloosa. 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[CONFIRM] If the first number of the Pick3 draw on [LOTTERYDATE] is [LOTTERYNUMBER], $[AMOUNT FROM ABOVE] 
will be sent to [CHARITY] for its services to welfare recipients and other poor people in [TOWN], and $[100 – 
AMOUNT FROM ABOVE] will be sent to you as a credit of [1000*REMAINDER] bonus points to your Knowledge 
Networks account. 
 
Is this correct? 
Yes ..........................................................................[1] 
No, I would like to change my answer......................[2] 
 
[SHOWN GIVING DURING EXPERIMENT AGAIN IF RESPONDENT SELECTS “NO” IN CONFIRM] 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[HYPOTHETICAL GIVING].  
 
[SHOWN FOLLOWING IF GIVING =0] 
Suppose that [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa had mailed a letter to your home describing the plight of welfare 
recipients and other poor people in Tuscaloosa and had asked you for a donation. How much, if anything, 
would you have given?  
 
[GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0-99999] 
 
[SHOWN FOLLOWING IF GIVING >0] 
Suppose that you had not just given $[GIVING] to [CHARITY]. Instead, suppose that [CHARITY] in 
Tuscaloosa had mailed a letter to your home describing the plight of welfare recipients and other poor 
people in Tuscaloosa and had asked you for a donation. How much, if anything, would you have given? 
 
[GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0-99999] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
PART III. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FOOD PANTRY RECIPIENTS 
Factual questions about recipients of [CHARITY] 
 
From the information presented earlier, you may have learned more about [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa. Now, we’d 
like to ask you some questions about [CHARITY] and about the characteristics of people who receive aid from 
[CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa.  
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
It is very important to us that you answer these questions as carefully as possible. We will give you 1500 bonus 
points for completing this section of the study. In return, we would appreciate it if you would put in extra effort to 
answer these questions as carefully as possible. 
[GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0-99999] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[INCOME OF CHARITY RECIPIENTS]   
We’d like to know what you think the median household income is for recipients of [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa. The 
median (i.e., middle) household income is the income where half of the [CHARITY] recipients’ households are 
richer and half are poorer.  
 
As a reference, the Federal poverty standard is currently about $20,000 for a family of 4, and exactly half of all 
households in the U.S. have an income less than $44,000 per year.   30
 
My best guess is that the median household income of recipients of [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa is about $___,000 
per year.  
[GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0 TO 100] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[PERCENT OF RECIPIENTS WILLING TO WORK HARD] 
As your best guess, what percentage of recipients of [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa are willing to work hard in 
order to get ahead in life? 
[GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0 TO 100] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[PERCENT OF RECIPIENTS WITH A CRIMINAL RECORD] 
  As your best guess, what percentage of recipients of [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa have a criminal record?  
[GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0 TO 100] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[PERCENT OF RECIPIENTS ATTENDING CHURCH] 
As your best guess, what percentage of recipients of [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa attend religious services 
almost every week?   
[GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0 TO 100] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[REASON FOR POVERTY] 
  As you recall, the recipients of [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa are poor - they are welfare recipients and other 
poor people. 
 
As your best guess, what percentage of recipients of [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa are poor mainly because 
of reasons beyond their control? 
 [GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0 TO 100] 
 
As your best guess, what percentage of recipients of [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa are poor mainly because 
of bad choices in their personal lives? 
 [GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0 TO 100] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[PERCENT OF RECIPIENTS WILLING TO SHARE ASSISTANCE] 
  As your best guess, what percentage of recipients of [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa would be willing to share 
some of the assistance they receive with others in need?  
[GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0 TO 100] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[PERCENT OF RECIPIENTS WHO WORK] 
  As your best guess, what percentage of adult recipients of [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa currently work at 
least 20 hours per week for pay?   
[GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0 TO 100] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[PERCENT OF RECIPIENTS RECEIVING ASSISTANCE SHORT TERM] 
As your best guess, what percentage of recipients of [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa rely on charity assistance 
only for a short period of time (less than six months) in order to overcome a period of difficulty?   
[GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0 TO 100] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[PERCENT OF RECIPIENTS WHO VOTED FOR BUSH] 
  Now, we'd like to ask you about recipients of [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa who voted in the 2004 
Presidential election. As your best guess, what percentage of these people voted for George W. Bush? 
[GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0 TO 100] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[INCOME OF TUSCALOOSA POPULATION]   31
As your best guess, what is the median household income in Tuscaloosa? The median (i.e., middle) 
household income in the city is the household income where half of the households in the city are richer 
and half are poorer. (The median household income in the whole of the U.S. is $44,000 per year). 
 
The median household income in Tuscaloosa is about $___,000 per year. 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[PART IV. SURVEY QUESTIONS] 
Survey questions 
 
Now we’d like to ask you some survey questions about poverty and other issues. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Please simply answer the questions as truthfully as you can. 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON RECIPIENTS IN TUSCALOOSA] 
  Compared to the current level of spending, do you think the government should spend more or less of its 





   Government 
should spend 
the same 
   Government 
should spend 
much MORE 
     [1]             [2]            [3]             [4]                     [5]                        [6]                      [7] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[CHARITY SPENDING ON RECIPIENTS IN TUSCALOOSA] 
  Compared to their current level of spending, do you think that charities should spend more or less of their 





   Charities 
should spend 
the same 
   Charities 
should spend 
much MORE 
     [1]             [2]            [3]             [4]                     [5]                        [6]                      [7] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[CHARITY EFFECTIVENESS] 
How effective do you think [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa is at getting aid to needy recipients?  More 
specifically, out of every $100.00 that is donated to it, how many dollars do you think go to needy 
recipients?   
[GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0 TO 100] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[PERSONAL CONNECTION TO POVERTY] 





[PREFERENCES FOR SOCIAL SPENDING]   
We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. 
Below, we list two of these problems. For each one, please tell us whether you think we’re spending too 
much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.  
 
 
Programs for the poor (e.g., “welfare” or programs like TANF, food stamps, and public housing) 
Spending too 
LITTLE 
   Spending 
about the 
right amount 
   Spending  too 
MUCH 
     [1]             [2]            [3]             [4]                     [5]                        [6]                      [7] 
 
  Social insurance programs (e.g. Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, and Medicare?).   32
Spending too 
LITTLE 
   Spending 
about the 
right amount 
   Spending  too 
MUCH 
     [1]             [2]            [3]             [4]                     [5]                        [6]                      [7] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[CHARITABLE GIVING TO KATRINA RELIEF] 
What, approximately, is the total amount of money that you and people in your household have donated 
towards the Katrina relief effort? 




[CHARITABLE GIVING TO CHARITIES FOR POVERTY]   
[SHOWN FOLLOWING IF GIVING =0]. 
What, approximately, is the total amount of money that you and people in your household have donated 
in 2005 to charities that help poor people in the U.S.? 
 
$ _____ 
[GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0 TO 999999] 
 
[SHOWN FOLLOWING IF GIVING >0].  
Not including any amount you may have given during his survey, what, approximately, is the total amount 
of money that you and people in your household have donated in 2005 to charities that help poor people 
in the U.S.? 
 
$ _____ 
[GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0 TO 999999] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[TOTAL CHARITABLE GIVING] 
  What, approximately, is the total amount of money that you and people in your household donated 
towards all charitable causes in 2005? 
 
$ _____ 
[GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0 TO 999999] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[CHARITABLE GIVING TO CHARITIES FOR LOCAL POVERTY] 
  Now, we’d like to ask about your charitable giving to help poor people in your local area. By “local area” 
we mean the greater metropolitan area of the town or city that you live in or near. If you live in a rural area 
and are not part of a greater metropolitan area, then “local area” means your county. 
 
What, approximately, is the total amount of money that you and people in your household have donated 
in 2005 to charities that help poor people in your local area? 
[GIVEN A NUMBER BOX WITH RANGE 0 TO 999999] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[REASONS FOR POVERTY] 
  Now, we would like to ask you about some of the possible reasons why people are poor. 
 
For each of the possible reasons listed below, please tell us how important you believe it is in explaining why 
some people in this country are poor. 
  
Failure of society to provide good schools for everyone 
Not at all 
important 
   Somewhat 
important 
   Extremely 
important 
[1]            [2]            [3]            [4]                       [5]    [6]    [7] 
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Loose morals and substance abuse 
Not at all 
important 
   Somewhat 
important 
   Extremely 
important 
[1]            [2]            [3]            [4]                       [5]    [6]    [7] 
 
 
Failure of the economy to provide enough jobs 
Not at all 
important 
   Somewhat 
important 
   Extremely 
important 
[1]            [2]            [3]            [4]                       [5]    [6]    [7] 
 
 
Lack of effort by the poor themselves  
Not at all 
important 
   Somewhat 
important 
   Extremely 
important 
[1]            [2]            [3]            [4]                       [5]    [6]    [7] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[LIFE PRIORITIES 1] 
There are many important things in life, but some are more important than others. We are going to ask 
you about the five most important things from the list below. 
 
First, what do you believe is the most important? 
 
“Always to obey the law” ..........................................[1]  
“To help others in need”...........................................[2] 
“To enjoy life” ...........................................................[3] 
“To work hard”..........................................................[4] 
“To pray and go to church”.......................................[5] 
“To earn a lot of money”...........................................[6] 
“To avoid having to depend on government 
assistance” .........................................................[7] 
“To be financially independent”................................[8] 
“To care for children”................................................[9] 
“To get respect from others”....................................[10] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[LIFE PRIORITIES 2]  What do you believe is second most important? 
[SHOWN RESPONSES NOT SELECTED ABOVE] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[LIFE PRIORITIES 3]  What do you believe is third most important? 
[SHOWN RESPONSES NOT SELECTED ABOVE] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[LIFE PRIORITIES 4]  What do you believe is fourth most important? 
[SHOWN RESPONSES NOT SELECTED ABOVE] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[LIFE PRIORITIES 5]  What do you believe is fifth most important? 
[SHOWN RESPONSES NOT SELECTED ABOVE] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[PERCENT OF RECIPIENTS WHO ARE (RACE)] 
  As your best guess, what percentage of recipients of [CHARITY] in [TOWN] are:  
 
White _____% 
African American _____% 
Another race _____% 
   34
[SHOWN NUMBER BOXES WITH RANGE 0 TO 100 SUMMING TO 100; RESPONDENTS WERE SHOWN SUM BOX FOR 
AMOUNTS ENTERED AND PROGRAM RECORDED HOW MANY TIMES RESPONDENT GOT A WARNING ABOUT 
PERCENTAGES NOT EQUALING 100] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[PERCENT OF RECIPIENTS WHO ARE (RACE)] 
  As your best guess, what percentage of all residents of [TOWN] are:  
White _____% 
African American _____% 
Another race _____% 
 
[SHOWN NUMBER BOXES WITH RANGE 0 TO 100 SUMMING TO 100; RESPONDENTS WERE SHOWN SUM BOX FOR 
AMOUNTS ENTERED AND PROGRAM RECORDED HOW MANY TIMES RESPONDENT GOT A WARNING ABOUT 
PERCENTAGES NOT EQUALING 100] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[SOCIAL CONTACTS] 
  How often do you socialize with friends from the following racial and ethnic groups?  
 
Caucasian Americans (Whites) 
Never Once  a 
year or less 












        [1]       [2]                   [3]                   [4]                    [5]                 [6]     [7] 
 
African Americans 
Never Once  a 
year or less 












        [1]       [2]                   [3]                   [4]                    [5]                 [6]     [7] 
 
People from other racial or ethnic groups 
Never Once  a 
year or less 












        [1]       [2]                   [3]                   [4]                    [5]                 [6]     [7] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[PERCEIVED RACIAL DISADVANTAGE]   
Just in your opinion, how do the economic opportunities of African Americans compare to the economic 
opportunities of other Americans? Do African Americans get many fewer opportunities, about the same 
number, or many more opportunities than other Americans? 
Many 
FEWER 
   About  the 
same 
   Many  MORE 
        [1]            [2]                       [3]                     [4]                       [5]                       [6]     [7] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[ITEMIZE DEDUCTIONS] 






[STANDARD CLOSE]  
Thinking about this topic, do you have any comments you would like to share? 
[OPEN ENDED TEXT BOX PROVIDED] 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean  S.D.  Min  Max  N 
Outcome Variables          
Giving During the Experiment ($ out of $100)  58.7 37.2  0 100  982 
   Fraction Giving $100  0.355 0.5 0  1  982 
   Fraction Giving $50  0.209 0.4 0  1  982 
   Fraction Giving $0  0.109 0.3 0  1  982 
   Fraction Giving Some Other Amount  0.328 0.5 0  1  982 
Hypothetical Giving ($, topcoded at $500)  11.6 29.6  0 500  980 
Self-Reported Preference for Government Spending on Poor in 
Tuscaloosa (1-7 scale)  4.5 1.5  1  7 977 
Self-Reported Preference for Charity Spending on Poor in 
Tuscaloosa (1-7 scale)  4.6 1.2  1  7 972 
Experimental Treatment Variables          
Black Picture  0.496 0.5 0  1  982 
Reason for Poverty Beyond Control, Willing to Work  0.241 0.4 0  1  982 
Reason for Poverty Bad Choices, Not Willing to Work  0.250 0.4 0  1  982 
Law-Abiding  0.520 0.5 0  1  982 
Shares Own Aid with Others  0.476 0.5 0  1  982 
Short-Term Need for Aid  0.507 0.5 0  1  982 
Currently Working  0.516 0.5 0  1  982 
Religious  0.530 0.5 0  1  982 
City is Republican  0.507 0.5 0  1  982 
City is Economically Advantaged  0.506 0.5 0  1  982 
Salvation Army  0.494 0.5 0  1  982 
# Worthiness Treatments (derived variable, 0-1 scale)  0.497 0.2 0  1  982 
Perception Variables          
Perceived Percentage of White Aid Recipients  28.0 16.1  0 100  965 
Perceived Percentage of Black Aid Recipients  56.6 18.4  0 100  965 
Perceived Percentage of Aid Recipients from Another Race  15.5 11.7  0  90 965 
Perceived Percentage Black – Percent White Aid Recipients  28.6 32.4 -100  100  965 
Perceived Percentage of Aid Recipients Willing to Work Hard  53.0 24.5  0 100  978 
Perceived Percentage of Aid Recipients Whose Reasons for 
Poverty Are Beyond Control  46.8 23.3  0 100  977 
Perceived Percentage of Aid Recipients Whose Reasons for 
Poverty Are Bad Choices  49.2 22.6  0 100  973 
Perceived Percentage of Aid Recipients with a Criminal Record  37.0 22.2  0 100  971 
Perceived Percentage of Aid Recipients Willing to Share Own 
Aid with Others  36.7 26.9  0 100  978 
Perceived Percentage of Aid Recipients on Short-Term 
Assistance  39.6 24.1  0 100  972 
Perceived Percentage of Aid Recipients Who Attend Religious 
Services Weekly  52.4 24.3  0 100  969 
Perceived Percentage of Aid Recipients Who Voted for Bush  37.8 29.2  0 100  968 
Perceived Average Income of Tuscaloosa Aid Recipients, 
Thousands of Dollars per Year  15.4 7.8  0 73  977 
Perceived Average Income of All Tuscaloosa Residents, 
Thousands of Dollars per Year  26.5 11.4  0  70 971 
Perceived Percent Black – Percent White City Residents  11.8 35.2 -100  100  949 
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Control Variables 
Age  48.3 16.9 18.0  92.0  982 
Age
2/100  26.2 17.0 3.24  84.6  982 
White  0.705 0.456 0 1  982 
Black  0.120 0.325 0 1  982 
Other Race  0.175 0.381 0 1  982 
Less than High School  0.112 0.315 0 1  982 
High School Degree  0.332 0.471 0 1  982 
Some College  0.287 0.453 0 1  982 
College Degree or Higher  0.270 0.444 0 1  982 
Log Household Income  10.6 0.889  7.8 12.8  982 
Dual Income  0.525 0.500 0 1  982 
Married  0.528 0.499 0 1  982 
Male  0.488 0.500 0 1  982 
Single Male  0.204 0.403 0 1  982 
Resides in South  0.367 0.482 0 1  982 
Working  0.615 0.487 0 1  982 
Disabled  0.064 0.245 0 1  982 
Retired  0.174 0.379 0 1  982 
Fraction Who Gave to Charities in 2005  0.810 0.393 0 1  982 
Log Total Charitable Giving in 2005  6.0 1.6  0.7  11.9  784 
Fraction Who Gave to Charities for the Poor in 2005  0.726 0.446 0 1  982 
Log Total Giving to Charities for the Poor in 2005  5.4 1.4  1.6  10.1  708 
Means and standard deviations are weighted to correct for oversampling of black respondents. The variable  # 
Worthiness Treatments is the average of the following four audio treatments: Reasons for poverty bad choices 
(reverse coded), reasons for poverty beyond control, law abiding, and willing to share own aid. The variable 
Worthiness Perceptions is the average of the five corresponding perceptions questions: Reasons for poverty bad 
choices (reverse coded), reasons for poverty beyond control, willing to work, possessing a criminal record (reverse 
coded), and willing to share own aid. 
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Table 2a: Effects of Treatments on Perceptions 
  Perceptions of Aid Recipients (Percentage with Property Listed in Column Heading) 
 (1)  (2a)  (2b)    (2c)  (3)  (4) 
  Black-White  Willing to Work Reason Is 
Beyond Control 




Shares Own Aid 
with Others 
Treatments (column where treatment is 
expected to have a direct effect) 
            
  a. Black Picture (1 & 10)  21.8
*** (2.0) -4.0
*** (1.6) -4.1
*** (1.5)   -5.0
*** (1.4) -3.8
*** (1.4) -0.4  (1.7) 
  b. Reason for Poverty Beyond Control, 






*** (1.7) 1.7  (2.2) 
  c. Reason for Poverty Bad Choices,  
    Not Willing to Work (2-)  -0.3 (2.5)  -5.2
*** (2.0) -2.6  (1.8) 
 
-3.3
*  (1.8) -1.0  (1.8) -2.7  (2.1) 
  d. Law-Abiding (3)  -1.3 (2.0)  1.4 (1.6)  2.4
* (1.5)    3.3
** (1.4) 4.3
*** (1.4) 0.4  (1.7) 
  e. Shares Own Aid with Others (4)  -1.2 (2.0)  3.1
** (1.6) 1.9  (1.5)    3.7
** (1.5) 2.2  (1.4)  10.9
*** (1.8) 
  f. Short-Term Need for Aid (5)  1.3 (2.0)  2.3 (1.6)  2.9
** (1.5)   -0.4 (1.5)  1.6 (1.4)  -0.6 (1.8) 
  g. Currently Working (6)  3.7
*  (2.0)  -0.5 (1.6)  0.1 (1.5)    1.5 (1.5)  -0.8 (1.4)  -2.5 (1.8) 
 h.  Religious  (7)  -0.2 (2.0)  1.1 (1.6)  0.3 (1.5)   -1.0 (1.5)  1.4 (1.4)  -0.7 (1.7) 
  i. City Republican (8)   -1.2 (2.0)  0.9 (1.6)  1.0 (1.5)    0.3 (1.5)  0.7 (1.4)  -0.3 (1.7) 
  j. City Economically Advantaged (9 & 11)  -4.4
** (2.0)  -0.1 (1.6)  0.0 (1.5)    2.6
*  (1.4)  0.3 (1.4)  -0.2 (1.8) 
  k. Salvation Army  -0.3 (2.0)  1.2 (1.6)  0.4 (1.5)   -2.5
*  (1.5) -0.7  (1.4) -2.4  (1.7) 
Respondent  Characteristics           
 Black  Respondent  -7.8
*** (3.0) 4.8
** (2.2) 6.2
*** (2.1)   4.2
** (2.0)  -0.6 (2.0)  0.9 (2.3) 
  Other Demographic Controls  Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.159 0.083 0.111    0.098 0.126 0.071 
N  965 978 977    973 971 978 
Note:  Results are weighted to correct for oversampling of black respondents. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 
percent; *** 1 percent. Each column is a separate OLS regression with as dependent variable the perception listed in the column heading. See Appendix A for the 
exact definitions of the experimental treatments. The number in parentheses behind each treatment denote the column number(s) of the perceptions we indeed to 
be affected by the treatment variable. The demographic controls consist of the variables listed under the heading “control variables” in Table 1. 
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Table 2b: Effects of Treatments on Perceptions 
  Perceptions of Aid Recipients 
(Percentage with Property Listed in Column Heading) 
 Perceptions  of  Tuscaloosa 
Residents 





Religious Republican  Income 
($’000 / year)
 Black-White Income 
($’000 / year)
Treatments (column where treatment is 
expected to have a direct effect) 
            
  a. Black Picture (1 & 10)  0.5 (1.6) -1.8 (1.4) 2.0 (1.6) -1.9 (1.7) -0.9
* (0.5)   15.3
*** (2.3) -0.1 (0.7)
  b. Reason for Poverty Beyond Control, 
   Willing to Work (2+)  0.4 (1.9) 4.1
** (1.9) 0.7 (2.0) 0.7 (2.1) -0.2  (0.6)
 
2.5 (2.9) 0.5  (0.9)
  c. Reason for Poverty Bad Choices,  
    Not Willing to Work (2-)  -1.1 (2.0) -0.5 (1.7) -3.6
* (2.0) -2.5  (2.1) -0.6  (0.6)
 
1.5 (2.8) 0.7  (0.9)
  d. Law-Abiding (3)  -3.3
** (1.6) 0.4 (1.4) -0.8 (1.6) 0.3 (1.7) -0.3  (0.5)   -2.2 (2.3) 1.1  (0.7)
  e. Shares Own Aid with Others (4)  2.6 (1.6) 1.6 (1.5) 0.8 (1.6) -1.1 (1.7) 0.4  (0.5)  0.2 (2.3) -0.4  (0.7)
  f. Short-Term Need for Aid (5)  6.1
*** (1.6) 1.1 (1.5) 0.1 (1.6) -1.1 (1.7) 0.4  (0.5)  1.0 (2.3) 0.8  (0.7)
  g. Currently Working (6)  -1.4 (1.6) -2.5
*  (1.5) 0.4 (1.6) -0.8 (1.7) 0.0  (0.5)  2.0 (2.3) -0.4  (0.7)
 h.  Religious  (7)  1.2 (1.6) 1.1 (1.5) 7.4
*** (1.6) 4.7
***  (1.7) 0.1 (0.5)   1.8  (2.3) 0.0 (0.7)
  i. City Republican (8)   -0.9 (1.6) -0.1 (1.5) 2.5 (1.6) 28.4
*** (1.7) -0.6  (0.5)   -4.0
* (2.3) 0.9  (0.7)
  j. City Economically Advantaged (9 & 11)  -2.2 (1.6) 0.4 (1.4) -0.6 (1.6) -4.4
*** (1.7) 1.5
*** (0.5)  -10.7
*** (2.3) 5.5
*** (0.7)
  k. Salvation Army  0.5 (1.6) 1.4 (1.4) -1.3 (1.6) 4.0
**  (1.7) 0.6 (0.5)   1.9  (2.3) -0.5 (0.7)
Respondent  Characteristics            
 Black  Respondent  3.2 (2.3) -1.9 (2.0) 0.0 (2.2) -6.4
*** (2.4) -1.5
** (0.7)  -3.8 (3.4) -6.3
*** (0.9)
  Other Demographic Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.049 0.040 0.063 0.269  0.080    0.097  0.175 
N  972 966 969 968  977    949  971 
Note:  Results are weighted to correct for oversampling of black respondents. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 





   40
Table 3: Perceptions of Race and Worthiness 




Respondents  Black Respondents   All Respondents 
Panel A: Race Perceptions (Dependent variable: perceived percentage black recipients – perceived percentage white recipients) 
Treatments                  
 Black  Picture  21.8
*** (2.0) 21.1
*** (2.2) 28.9
*** (5.4)  21.2
*** (2.2) 
  # Worthiness Treatments  -0.1 (3.9) -3.1 (4.2)  19.0
* (10.2)   -2.9  (4.2) 
  Black Picture × Black Respondent            4.8 (5.4) 
  # Worthiness Treatments × Black Respondent            21.3
** (10.3)
          
Controls for Other Treatments  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes 
Controls for Demographics  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes 
R
2 0.157  0.152  0.266    0.161 
N 965  764  201    965 
                  
Panel B: Worthiness Perceptions (Dependent variable: Average of 5 perceptions questions related to worthiness) 
Treatments               
 Black  Picture  -3.6
*** (1.0) -4.2
*** (1.1) -0.6  (2.1)   -4.2
*** (1.1) 
  # Worthiness Treatments  15.2
*** (2.1) 16.7
*** (2.3) 8.9
** (4.2)    16.4
*** (2.3) 
  Black Picture × Black Respondent            5.0
** (2.4) 
  # Worthiness Treatments × Black Respondent            -9.8
** (4.8) 
          
Controls for Other Treatments  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes 
Controls for Demographics  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes 
R
2 0.126  0.148  0.183    0.131 
N 960  760  200    960 
               
Note:  Results are weighted to correct for oversampling of black respondents. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 
percent; *** 1 percent. The variable  # Worthiness Treatments is the average of the following four audio treatments: Reasons for poverty bad choices (reverse 
coded), reasons for poverty beyond control, law abiding, and willing to share own aid. The variable Worthiness Perceptions is the average of the five 
corresponding perceptions questions: Reasons for poverty bad choices (reverse coded), reasons for poverty beyond control, willing to work, possessing a criminal 
record (reverse coded), and willing to share own aid. The controls for other treatments consist of the following six treatment variables: short-term need for aid, 
currently working, religious, city republican, city economically advantaged, and salvation army. The demographic controls consist of the variables listed under 
the heading “control variables” in Table 1.   41
Table 4: Giving During the Experiment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Dependent Variable:  











Treatments                 
 Black  Picture  -2.2 (2.3)  -2.3 (2.3)  -2.3 (2.6) -3.8  (4.8)  -2.3  (2.6) 
  # Worthiness Treatments     11.0
** (4.7) 13.0
** (5.3) -5.7  (9.2)  13.4
** (5.2) 
  Black Picture × Black Respondent              0.4 (5.3) 
  # Worthiness Treatments × Black Respondent             -18.8
* (10.8)
                     
  Reason for Poverty Beyond Control,  
Willing to Work 
-1.6  (2.9)              
  Reason for Poverty Bad Choices,  
Not Willing to Work 
-4.4  (2.9)              
 Law-Abiding  2.7  (2.4)              
  Shares Own Aid with Others  5.2
** (2.4)              
                    
  Short-Term Need for Aid  -1.3 (2.3)  -1.4 (2.3)  -0.4 (2.6) -5.9  (4.7)  -1.4  (2.3) 
 Currently  Working  -0.7 (2.4)  -0.2 (2.4)  -1.3 (2.6) 5.7  (5.2)  -0.2  (2.4) 
 Religious  -3.0 (2.3)  -3.1 (2.3)  -3.6 (2.6) 1.2  (4.7)  -3.0  (2.4) 
 City  Republican  2.9 (2.3)  2.8 (2.3)  3.4 (2.6)  -2.6 (4.7)  2.8 (2.3) 
  City Economically Advantaged  -1.8 (2.3)  -1.6 (2.3) -0.8  (2.6) -8.4
* (5.0)  -1.5  (2.3) 
 Salvation  Army  0.2 (2.4)  0.6 (2.3)  -0.3 (2.6)  4.8 (4.6)  0.7 (2.4) 
          
Controls  for  Demographics  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.134 0.133 0.133 0.200  0.133 
N  982 982 778 204  982 
Note:  Results are weighted to correct for oversampling of black respondents. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 
percent; *** 1 percent. The variable  # Worthiness Treatments is the average of the four audio treatments: Reasons for poverty bad choices (reverse coded), 
reasons for poverty beyond control, law abiding, and willing to share own aid. The demographic controls consist of the variables listed under the heading 
“control variables” in Table 1.   42
Table 5: Effect of Endogenous versus Exogenous Perceptions on Giving 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  Dependent Variable:  
Giving during the Experiment ($ out of $100)  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
Perceptions                
  Perceived % Black - % White Aid Recipients  0.00 (0.04) 0.07  (0.14)  0.00 (0.04) 0.08  (0.14) 
 Worthiness  Perceptions  0.49
*** (0.08) 0.86
** (0.34)  0.50
*** (0.08) 0.87
** (0.34) 
  (Perceived % Black - % White Aid Recipients) 
×  Black Respondent 
      
0.06 (0.08) -0.12  (0.26) 
  Worthiness Perceptions × Black Respondent         -0.10 (0.19) -1.93  (1.52) 
               
Controls for Other Treatments  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls for Demographics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2 0.161  0.138  0.163  0.105 
N 751  751  949  949 
Note:  Results are weighted to correct for oversampling of black respondents. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 
percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. The variable Worthiness Perceptions is the average of the five corresponding perceptions questions: Reasons 
for poverty bad choices (reverse coded), reasons for poverty beyond control, willing to work, possessing a criminal record (reverse coded), and 
willing to share own aid. The controls for other treatments consist of the following six treatment variables: short-term need for aid, currently 
working, religious, city republican, city economically advantaged, and salvation army. The demographic controls consist of the variables listed under 
the heading “control variables” in Table 1. In the IV regressions, race perceptions and worthiness perceptions are instrumented by the black picture 
treatment and by the number of worthiness treatments. The sample in columns (1) and (2) is limited to non-black respondents while the sample in 
columns (3) and (4) consists of the total sample. 
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Table 6: Robustness of the Main Result 
  Black Picture  # Worthiness Treatments R
2 N 
Regression Specification:             
1. Baseline (Non-Black Respondents Only)  -2.3 (2.6)  13.0
** (5.3)  0.133  778 
2. Entire Sample  -2.3 (2.3)  11.0
** (4.7)  0.131  982 
3. Whites Only  -3.6 (2.9)  12.7
** (6.0)  0.133  623 
4. Ordered Probit  -0.05 (0.08)  0.40
** (0.16) 0.033 778 
5. Censored Regression  -3.3 (4.8)  25.4
*** (9.9)  0.021  778 
6. No Demographic Controls  -1.9 (2.7)  16.1
*** (5.4)  0.021  778 
7. Additional Controls  -0.2 (2.6)  12.5
** (5.3)  0.179  761 
8. Hypothetical Giving as Dependent Variable  -0.4 (2.2)  -4.5 (3.3)  0.087  777 
9. Self-Reported Preference for Government Spending 
     on the Poor in Tuscaloosa as Dependent Variable 
-0.06 (0.10)  0.46
** (0.20) 0.110 773 
10. Self-Reported Preference for Charity Spending  
      on the Poor in Tuscaloosa as Dependent Variable 
0.06 (0.08)  0.28 (0.17)  0.101  769 
Note:  Results are weighted to correct for oversampling of black respondents. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 
percent; *** 1 percent. The baseline regression is the regression of giving during the experiment on treatments and demographics as reported in column 2 of 
Table 4. All other regressions are identical to the baseline regression except for the change noted in the first column. The additional controls in row 7 consist of: 
the perceived effectiveness of the charity (measured as fraction of dollars donated to charity reaching needy recipients), the self-reported importance of “helping 
others in need,” and the self-reported importance of “earning a lot of money.” 
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Table 7: Predictors of Giving During the Experiment vs. Past Charitable Giving 











Predicted Charitable Giving         0.43
*** (0.06)    
Predicted Giving in Experiment           1.18
*** (0.11)
Age  1.2
*** (0.4) -0.3  (0.5)      
Age
2/100  -0.7  (0.5) 0.7  (0.5)      
Non-Hispanic Black  -6.9
**  (3.0) -0.3  (3.5)      
Other Race  -3.6  (3.3) 4.9  (3.6)      
Less than High School  5.0  (4.3) -4.7  (4.6)      
Some College  3.7 (3.0) 8.4
**  (3.3)      
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher  7.7
** (3.3) 15.6
*** (3.5)      
Log Household Income  3.5
** (1.6) 14.4
*** (1.8)      
Dual Income  -2.7  (2.6) 0.4  (2.8)      
Married  -2.7  (3.4) 2.4  (3.9)      
Male  0.8  (3.4) -1.9  (3.5)      
Single Male  -3.9  (4.9) -4.0  (5.2)      
Resides in South  -2.6 (2.5) 5.2
**  (2.6)      
Working  2.0  (3.7) -1.9  (4.2)      
Disabled  -10.3
* (6.1) -11.2
*  (6.1)      
Retired  -0.2  (5.3) 0.8  (5.5)      
R
2 0.098  0.208  0.050  0.106 
N 982  955  982  955 
Mean of Dependent Variable  58.6  55.1  58.6  55.1 
Std. Dev. of Dependent Variable  37.3  42.0  37.3  42.0 
Fraction Equal to 0  0.11  0.16  0.11  0.16 
Fraction Equal to 100  0.35  0.35  0.35  0.35 
Note:  Results are weighted to correct for oversampling of black respondents. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. The dependent variable in columns (1) 
and (3) is the number of dollars given during the experiment (out of $100). The dependent variable in columns (2) 
and (4) is a transformed measure of total self-reported charitable giving in 2005. To make the scale of the charitable 
giving variable comparable to the scale of giving during the experiment, we topcode charitable giving at $500 so 
that the fraction of individuals giving the maximum amount is equal. Next, we divide the charitable giving variable 
by 5, so that both dependent variables are measured on a 0-100 scale. The variable Predicted Charitable Giving is 
the amount predicted by the regression in column (2). The variable Predicted Giving in Experiment is the amount 
predicted by the regression in column (1).   45








 Mean  SD  Mean  SD    (KN-CPS)  p-value 
Age  48.3 16.9  45.7 17.4    2.6  0.00 
Age
2/100  26.2 17.0  23.9 17.3    2.3  0.00 
Education            
  Less than High School  0.112 0.315  0.154 0.361    -0.042 0.00 
  High School  0.332 0.471  0.317 0.465    0.015  0.34 
  Some College  0.287 0.453  0.269 0.439    0.018  0.23 
  Bachelor’s Degree or Higher  0.270 0.444  0.260 0.444    0.010  0.51 
Non- Hispanic Black  0.120 0.325  0.112 0.316    0.008  0.37 
Non-Hispanic White  0.705 0.456  0.695 0.460    0.009  0.52 
Other Race / Ethnic Group  0.175 0.381  0.192 0.394    -0.017 0.19 
Male  0.488 0.500  0.483 0.500    0.004  0.78 
Log Household Size  0.779 0.531  0.947 0.528    -0.168 0.00 
Log Household Income  10.599 0.889  10.74  0.984    -0.141  0.00 
Annual  Household Income               
  Less than $20,000  0.178 0.383  0.168 0.374    0.010  0.42 
  $20,000 to $40,000  0.275 0.447  0.237 0.425    0.038  0.01 
  $40,000 to $75,000  0.322 0.468  0.297 0.457    0.026  0.10 
  $75,000 to $100,000  0.119 0.324  0.124 0.330    -0.005 0.63 
  More than $100,000  0.106 0.308  0.174 0.379    -0.068 0.00 
Has Child under 18 in Household  0.254 0.435  0.299 0.458    -0.045 0.00 
Marital  Status            
 Married,  All  0.528 0.499  0.564 0.496    -0.036 0.03 
 Married  with  Children  0.164 0.370  0.243 0.429    -0.079 0.00 
  Married without Children  0.364 0.481  0.321 0.467    0.042  0.01 
 Single  without  Children  0.196 0.397  0.056 0.416    0.139  0.00 
  Divorced, Separated, or Widowed; 
without Children  0.187 0.390  0.222 0.364 
 
-0.036 0.01 
  Single, Divorced, Separated, or 
Widowed; with Children  0.090 0.286  0.157 0.231 
 
-0.067 0.00 
Region            
 Northeast  0.178 0.383  0.187 0.390    -0.009 0.49 
 Midwest  0.231 0.422  0.223 0.417    0.007  0.60 
 South  0.367 0.482  0.362 0.481    0.006  0.72 
 West  0.223 0.417  0.228 0.419    -0.004 0.76 
Live in Metropolitan Area  0.848 0.360  0.834 0.372    0.014  0.25 
Work  Status            
  Retired  0.174 0.379  0.163 0.369    0.011  0.38 
  Disabled  0.064 0.245  0.049 0.216    0.015  0.06 
  Unemployed, Laid Off, or Looking for 
Work  0.034 0.180  0.030 0.170 
 
0.004 0.51 
  Not Working for Some Other Reason  0.114 0.318  0.110 0.313    0.003  0.76 
The CPS data was extracted from the June 2006 Current Population Survey; the sample is limited to individuals 18 
and older. The number of observations in the Knowledge Networks data is 982. The Knowledge Networks means 
and standard deviations are weighted to correct for oversampling of black respondents. The number of observations 
for CPS data is 101,073, except for the income variables, which have 83,591 observations. 
 